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This study represents an initial attempt to examine some specific 
jiictors that might lead to large firms’ economies of scale. Multiple 
regression analysis is used to test hypotheses concerning scale op- 
portunities conferred o r 1  large CPA firms in dealing with regulatory 
complexity faced by the client. An analysis of interaction between 
audit firm size arid variables measuring client regulatory complexity 
shows that audit fees are lower for all firms in regulated industries 
compared to noitregulated industries-the dtfference being much 
greater, however, for Big Eight (now Big Six) firms, and audit fees 
charged by Big Eight firms are rituch lower when the auditor is 
involved with client security registratiotis. This relationship does 
tiot hold true for non-Big Eight firms involved with client registration 
statements. Based on these results, it appears that client regulatory 
complexity confers greater scale opportunities to larger audit firms 
compared to smaller ones. 
Several studies [ 1,2,3] examining auditor concentration in the U.S. audit 
market have provided evidence that substantial economies of scale exist for 
the CPA firm in dealing with the regulatory complexity faced by clients. 
These studies, however, did not directly examine production costs or audit 
fees. If economies of scale do exist, and assuming that relative production 
costs are reflected in the external audit fce, then audit fees charged by firms 
are expected to be lower in a regulated environment compared to a non- 
regulated one. The present study examines the effect of variables proxying 
for regulatory aspects of the client on external audit fees. 
As has been suggested by the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
[4] and Arnett and Danos 151, it can be argued that substantial economies 
of scale exist for the CPA tirms in dealing with the regulatory complexity 
faced by clients. For example, to issue an opinion on a client’s 10-K filing 
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with the SEC, a CPA firm must make substantial investments in human 
capital (expertise) related to SEC disclosure and measurement rules. Once 
this expertise has been acquired, additional clients subject to SEC filings 
can be serviced at lower marginal cost than the cost to service the first (or 
first few) such clients. Similar scale effects can be expected to occur within 
the contexts of clients issuing new publicly traded securities (capital market 
activity) and complying with industry-specific regulation. 
Eichenseher and Danos [3] developed a model that explains the level 
of auditor concentration in any given industry. The model shows that the 
level of auditor concentration is significantly and positively related to the 
degree of client-industry regulation and capital market activity. They at- 
tributed this finding to scale effects. Although this finding is interesting, an 
equally interesting and related question is whether these scale effects are 
passed on to the auditee in the form of a lower audit fee or do CPA firms 
actually operate as a cartel (taking advantage of their concentrated position). 
Danos and Eichenseher [ 1,2], in studying changes in seller concentration 
in the U.S. audit market over time, provided results consistent with the 
previous finding concerning possible scale effects in regulated industries. 
More specifically, in the 1982 study, larger CPA firms appeared to gain 
market shares overall; but in “nonregulated” industries, large industry- 
specific market shares tended to erode. Such erosion was not observed in 
“regulated” industries. In the 1986 study, Danos and Eichenseher concluded 
that for “regulated” client industries, evidence as to increasing competition 
among large CPA firms is lacking. Presumably, the scale opportunities in 
such environments confer competitive advantages on a small subset of large 
firms. The results of these studies suggest that the scale effects due to 
regulatory complexity are much greater for larger CPA firms. 
The purpose of the present study is to extend the work of Danos and 
Eichenseher [ 1,2,3] by examining the interrelationship between variables 
proxying for regulatory complexity and audit firm size on external audit 
fees. An audit fee model will include constructs on the two sources of 
mentioned regulatory complexity; that is, it is posited that greater scale 
opportunities exist with increased auditor involvement in the security reg- 
istration process (capital market activity) and in servicing clients in regulated 
industries. This study is important because it represents an initial attempt 
to consider factors other than firm size that may confer competitive advan- 
tages to CPA firms.’ It is also important to understand how these factors- 
1 .  According to Benston [ I  I], large accounting firms have the standardized audit methodology, 
staff size, and multiple-office locations to efficiently conduct audits of large companies. Small firms, 
on the other hand, are inefficient producers of such audits because of the need to develop more audit 
specific (rather than standardized) audit methodology, and extensive traveling or subcontracting with 
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client regulation and capital market activity, which are typically beyond the 
control of CPA firms-moderate in the relationship between audit firm size 
and audit fees. Further, the concerns of congressional critics about possible 
cartel pricing by larger CPA firms may be lessened if evidence is provided 
that scale effects accruing to these firms are being passed on to the auditee 
(consumer) in the form of a lower audit fee. 
The expectation is that the magnitude of the effect of audit firm size on 
audit fees is affected by or depends on the regulatory complexity of the 
client. A test of this requires an analysis of interaction effects, which has 
not been done previously in the literature. The primary hypotheses stated 
in alternate form are as follows: 
H,: There is a significant and positive interaction effect between variables 
measuring audit firm size and client capital market activity on external 
audit fees. 
H,: There is a significant and positive interaction effect between variables 
measuring audit firm size and client industry membership on external 
audit fees. 
1 .  Research Design and Sample Selection 
The audit fee regression model used to test the hypotheses is basically 
Simunic’s [6] and has stood the test of time. Therefore, it is not necessary 
to provide justification for the inclusion of his variables. Table 1 provides 
a summary of the variables used. Other studies using Simunic’s basic model 
include Francis [7], Francis and Stokes [8], Palmrose [9], and Francis and 
Simon [ 101. 
1.1 Sample 
A stratified sample of 500 companies was contacted during 1987 through 
a questionnaire mailed to the controller or chief financial officer. The sample 
was stratified by asset size (companies with assets of less than $150 million 
and those with assets greater than $150 million) and by auditor group (Big 
~~ ~ 
other auditors to deal with auditee size and multiple location problems. Also, complex accounting 
transactions and reporting requirements may requirc specialized auditor expertise. The costs of human 
capital investment required for these skill specializations can be spread over more audits thus creating 
scale economics. However, small firms face diseconomies of scale because these costs cannot he recouped 
over a large number of audits. 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
TABLE 1 
Variable and Operational Proxies 
Independent Variables 
Control Test Dependeni 
Variables Definition Variables Definition Variable Definition 
Assets 
Subs 
FA 
w 
p ” I A A  
OP 
ROI 
DA 
MON 
Total year-end Assets of Auditee 
Number of consolidated subsidiaries 
Ratio of foreign assets to total assets at 
yearend 
Internal audit activity as measured by 
the annual payroll of internal audit 
department/ total assets 
Type of audit opinion (1 = unqualified 
and consistency exception, 0 = 
“subject to” qualification) 
Return on investment (net income or 
net loss/totaI assets) 
Total long-term debt to total assets at 
yearend 
Month of year-end (1 = non-12/31 
year-end and 0 = 12/31 year-end) 
Fm-B8 Big Eight auditor size indicator variable FEE The total annual audit fee 
(1 = Big Eight firm and 0 = nondig 
Eight firm) 
paid to the external auditor 
I Industry regulatory complexity variable 
( I  = regulated and 0 = nonregulated 
industry) 
CM Variable measuring the amount of 
capital market activity as measured by 
the number of debt and equity security 
registration forms (i.e., the number of 
annually pursuant to the 1933 SEC Act 
over the period of 1983-1985. 
S-1’s. S-~’S, S-~’S, and S-7’s) filed 
Firm-BI*I Firm by industry interaction term 
Firm-B8*CM Fm by capital market activity 
interaction term 
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Eight’ firms versus non-Big Eight firms). Five regulated industries and five 
nonregulated industries are represented in the  ample.^ However, as dis- 
cussed later strong inferences cannot be drawn for individual industries due 
to the relatively small number of observations per industry. The one-page 
questionnaire consisted of items on audit fees, security registration, internal 
audit activity, the number of physical operating locations visited by the 
external auditor, and the number of consolidated subsidiaries, which were 
not available from public data sources such as the annual report and editions 
of Who Audits America [ 13].4 
Three years (1983-1985) of data were requested on each auditee. One 
hundred seven companies responded for a 21 percent response rate.’ Ob- 
servations for 12 companies in the sample were not usable due to the audit 
fee not being separable from other fees paid to the external auditor and/or 
incomplete data items.‘ 
Two hundred and sixty-three responses were obtained from the 95 com- 
panies retained in the sample. A few companies indicated that some of the 
data were not available for earlier years. Descriptive statistics by auditor 
size are provided in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, Big Eight auditors audit 
larger and more complex companies than non-Big Eight auditors. The audit 
fee model does control for these cross-sectional differences. 
A standard test of nonrespondent biases [ 151 was performed. The mean 
values of most of the variables reported by early and late respondents were 
2. The Big Eight auditors were Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young, Coopers and Lybrand, Deloitte 
Haskins and Sells, Ernst and Whinney, Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price Waterhouse, and Touche Ross. 
Since the collection of data for this study in 1987, Arthur Andersen and Arthur Young merged; and, 
Deloitte Haskins and Sells and Touche Ross merged. These firms are currently referred to as the Big 
Six instead of the Big Eight. 
3. Standard and Pour’s Register of Corporations, Directors. and Executives [ 121 and Who Audits 
America [ 131 were used as the data sources. Four strata were used. Two hundred and ninety companies 
with a Big Eight auditor were selected. One hundred and seventy-eight of these had assets greater than 
$150 million and the other 112 had assets less than $150 million. And, 210 companies with a non-Big 
Eight auditor were selected. One hundred and seventy-five were classified as small auditees and 30 were 
classified as large auditees. Regulated industries included in the sample were Trucking, Telecommu- 
nication, Gas and Electric Utilities, Savings and Loan, and Insurance. Nonregulated industries included 
were Oil and Gas, Steel, Office Equipment, Retail Grocery, and Hotel and Motel. The regulation 
captured is conditioned on its effect on formal accounting reports and the underlying audit process. 
Therefore, the assignment of companies to regulated/nonregulated categories based on the SIC code 
may be an oversimplification given the nature of this study. 
4. The questionnaire also requested items such as tax and management advisory services to ensure 
that these items were not included in the external audit fee. An item relating to the ownership of stock 
by officers and directors was also included, although these data are not used in the present study. Copies 
of the questionnaire are available on request. 
5 .  Sixty-seven of the 107 companies responding had a Big Eight auditor, and the remaining 40 
companies had a non-Big Eight auditor. 
6. Five of the 12 companies changed auditors during the sample period. There were only 2 
companies in the usable sample that changed auditors. The results of the tests were not changed when 
excluding these 2 companies from the analysis or when using an indicator variable to control for auditor 
changes. See De Angelo [ 141 for a discussion of low balling. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics by Auditor Size 
160 Observations on 
Auditees Using a 
Big Eight Auditor 
103 Observations on 
Auditees Using a 
Non-Big Eight Auditor 
Fee: Mean 
S.D. 
Assets: Mean 
S.D. 
AudL: Mean 
S.D. 
Subs: Mean 
S.D. 
FA: Mean 
S.D. 
R01: Mean 
S.D. 
DA: Mean 
S.D. 
IAA: Mean 
S.D. 
CM: Mean 
S.D. 
Percentage of observations 
in regulated industries 
Percentage of observations 
with 12/31 year-end 
Percentage of observations 
with “subject to” 
opinion 
$304.ot 
(422.00 
$2,849.3m 
(4,897. Im) 
5.4 
(6.4) 
15.1 
(32.8) 
(5 .5 )  
3.5% 
(6.1) 
26.1% 
(18.8) 
(3.8) 
1.5 
(2.4) 
1.7% 
.5% 
60.6% 
90.0% 
7.5% 
$56.41 
(59.01) 
$l09.0m 
(222.2111) 
1.7 
(1.1) 
2.3 
(2.9) 
(.7) 
-2.3% 
(19.7) 
. I %  
16.9% 
(19.5) 
.0038% 
(.0173) 
.29 
(.65) 
43.7% 
65.0% 
8.7% 
t = thousands 
m = millions 
not significantly different at P-value = However, the test of nonres- 
ponse bias seems to indicate a reluctance of companies in the sample with 
non-Big Eight auditors to respond on the first request for audit fee infor- 
mation. Only 28 percent of early responses were from companies with non- 
7. The first request for audit fee data was mailed to companies in the sample April 10, 1987, 
followed by a second request mailed five weeks from that date. Those companies responding by the 
mailing of the second request were classified as early respondents. One hundred and twenty-three 
observations were received from 44 early respondents, and 140 observations were received from 51 late 
respondents. 
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Big Eight auditors. Forty-nine percent of second requests represent com- 
panies with non-Big Eight auditors. This finding is consistent with the lower 
mean fee and assets of the late respondents. Fee and assets were significantly 
different among the early and late respondents at P-value = .07. This result 
is expected because companies with non-Big Eight auditors tend to be smaller 
in size and require less audit services from external auditors than larger 
companies. However, I cannot explain how the results would be affected 
in the absence of this nonresponse bias. Simunic [6] also reported a reluc- 
tance of companies using non-Big Eight auditors to respond to his survey. 
I .2 Capital Market Activity 
Eichenseher and Danos [3] posited that production economies of scale 
exist, in general, in the context of specialization. The effects of such spe- 
cialization become embedded in the firm to the extent that competitive 
markets for specialized products or services fail to evolve. They argued that 
greater scale opportunities exist in industries where companies are relatively 
more active in issuing new publicly traded securities. The fact that large 
CPA firms provide advanced in-house training courses related to SEC reg- 
istration is indirect support for this assumption. A CPA firm making a 
substantial investment in expertise related to SEC disclosure and measure- 
ment rules may service additional clients subject to SEC filings at a lower 
marginal cost than the cost to service the first such clients, once this expertise 
has been acquired. Eichenseher and Danos showed that the importance of 
new security issuances in a particular industry was positively related to the 
degree of auditor concentration. The importance of new security issuances 
was defined as the number of registration statements filed with the SEC by 
industry members, divided by the number of firms assigned to the industry 
SIC code by the SEC. The results supported their expectation that higher 
concentration levels would be expected in those industries where more 
pronounced economies of scale exist for the CPA firm. 
Assuming that relative production cost is reflected in external audit fees, 
then the effects of specialization and accompanying production scale econ- 
omies relating to new security registration should result in lower fees. The 
present study attempts to measure the spillover effect of specialized knowl- 
edge acquired in the registration process on the recurring annual audit. Thus, 
the annual audit fee requested in this study does not include the fee associated 
with the auditor’s involvement with the registration statements. The number 
of debt and equity security registration statements filed with the SEC (re- 
ferred to as the capital market activity variable-CM) by each auditee is 
used in this study. Based on the preceding discussion, the expectation is 
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that audit fees are lower for those auditees with greater involvement by the 
auditor in the security registration process.8 Further, these scale effects are 
much greater for larger CPA firms compared to smaller CPA firms. The 
alternative hypothesis was stated previously as hypothesis 1. 
1.3 Industry Regulatory Complexity 
Eichenseher and Danos [3] also posited that production economies of 
scale exist in the servicing of clients in “regulated” industries. This position 
was based on the effects of specialization discussed previously. They found 
auditor concentration to be a positive function of the degree of client-industry 
regulation. A binary variable was used to indicate whether a particular 
industry was subject to regulation that impacted directly on the construction 
of its members’ financial statements. As noted by Eichenseher and Danos 
the regulation captured by this variable is conditioned only on its effect on 
formal accounting reports and the underlying audit process, as almost all 
industries in the U.S. economy are “regulated” to some extent in the sense 
that governmental bodies place constraints on their actions. 
If concentration is explained by increasing production economies of 
scale due to industry regulatory complexity and relative production cost is 
reflected in external audit fees, then one would expect audit fees to be lower 
in regulated industries compared to nonregulated industries. The present 
study tests this hypothesis using the industry regulatory complexity (I) in- 
dicator variable. Also, as an alternative, a separate indicator variable for 
each particular industry is used because audit pricing may differ quite dra- 
matically even across regulated industries because of the different types and 
scopes of regulations.’ However, the coefficients for the individual industry 
variables are not meaningful and strong inferences cannot be drawn due to 
the relatively small number of observations per industry. 
The scale effects due to industry regulatory complexity are expected to 
be much greater for larger CPA firms compared to smaller CPA firms. The 
alternate hypothesis was stated previously as hypothesis 2. 
8. There could be cross-subsidies in that audit fees might be lower in the presence of greater 
values of CM because some of the audit work may be implicitly allocated to this work. This effect may 
also be related to the CPA’s desire to keep a growth or prestige client through discounted prices. 
9. Simunic’s [6] sample was sensitive to industry effects. A separate dummy variable for banks 
was significant in his study and banks were eventually dropped because they produced residual outliers, 
and were all audited by Big Eight firms. Francis [7] also reported a significant dummy variable for 
financial institutions and dropped those observations to produce a more homogeneous sample. The 
inclusion of financial institutions in other studies (for example 19)) did not appear to create a problem. 
Dummy variables for savings and loans and insurance companies were not significant in the present 
study. Nevertheless, the results of this study are substantially unchanged when these financial institutions 
are excluded. The coefficients for Trucking and Telecommunication are negative and significant at the 
.I0 and .01 levels, respectively. The coefficient for utilities is also negative but not significant. 
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2. Results 
The effect of the relationship between firm size and client regulation on 
audit fees is not tested in the large auditee subsample since the firm size 
variable is not significant (P-value = .985)." The emphasis of this study 
is that of examining the interaction effect of firm size, when it is significant, 
with variables measuring the degree of client-industry regulatory complexity 
or the amount of client capital market activity. 
The multiple regression models with the interaction effects for the small 
auditee subsample are presented in Table 3." The firm size variable is 
positive and significant (at P-value = .067), indicating that the Big Eight 
firms charge a premium over non-Big Eight firms in this small auditee 
subsample. This result is consistent with a Big Eight audit fee premium 
being observed in other studies [9,10] of small auditee subsamples of the 
U.S. audit market. 
The industry regulatory complexity variable (I) is negative and signif- 
icant (at the .018 level) as hypothesized, which indicates that audit fees are 
lower in regulated industries. However, the capital market activity variable 
(CM) is not significant (P-value = .719), which may be explained by the 
small number of security registration statements filed by small auditees. '' 
10. The audit fee model for the large auditee subsample is not presented. Nevertheless, no audit 
fee difference among the Big Eight and non-Big Eight finns is consistent with other studies (6.91 of 
large auditee subsamples in the U.S. audit market. The industry variable (I)  is also not significant (P- 
value = ,344). Whereas, the capital market activity variable (CM) is significant (P-value = ,023) and 
in the hypothesized direction (negative). 
I I ,  A null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed cannot be rejected at the .0S level 
for the sample, before or after transformation. using a Smirnov test. An inspection of the residual plots, 
however, indicates a more normal distribution about the mean after transformation of the data. A 
Goldfeld-Quandt test [ 161 is used to test for violation of the constant variance assumption. The null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected at the .OS level for the model with the transformed 
data. This hypothesis, however, is rejected at the .0.5 level when the data arc not transformed. Thus, 
the transformation procedure resulted in the equal variance assumption being met. In  the Goldfeld- 
Quandt test, regression models are run on an upper and lower percent of the sample based on the 
predicted values of the dependent variable. A central number of observations are omitted. The null 
hypothesis is that the sum of squared errors for the upper and lower percentage of the sample are equal. 
The central 20 percent of the ohservations were dropped for this test. 
12. As reported in footnote 10, the CM variable is significant in the large auditee subsample. 
Companies in the large auditee subsample filed more statements on average (mean = I .9 and standard 
deviation of 2.5) than companies in the small auditee subsample (mean = 0.2 and standard deviation 
of 0.5). The number of statements filed ranged from 0 to IS for the large auditee subsample, and from 
0 to 4 for the small auditee subsample. This is not inconsistent with larger companies requiring more 
capital for their level of operations and acquires the necessary financial capital through public offerings. 
The correlation between CM and Assets is ,678. which is moderately high as expected. However, an 
examination of the variance inflation factors (VIF) did not reveal any collinearity problems. According 
to Neter et al. [ 171, a VIF of 10 or more is a sign that multicollinearity may be a serious problem. The 
square root of assets has the highest VIF factor at 2.33. Therefore, the conclusion is that multicollinearity 
is not a problem of this study. As a matter of fact, the correlation between assets and CM is much 
higher than that between any other independent variables. 
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TABLE 3 
Regression Models with Interaction Effect 
Big 8 Versus Non-Big 8 in the Small Auditee Sample 
(139 Observations with Assets 5 $150m) 
Firm by Industry Interaction Firm by Capital Market Activiry 
Interaction 
Dependent variable: LFee 
Independent 
Variables 
RAssets 
RSubs 
FA 
ROI 
DA 
RlAA 
CM 
OP I 
0 
I’ I 
0 
MONl 
0 
Firm-B8 
Non B8 
Firm-B8*I 
Firm-BS*CM 
Overall F-test 
P-value 
RSquare 
Standard Standard 
Coefficient Error F Statistic P-Value Coeflcient Error F Statistic P-  Value 
0.0071 0.0005 
0.0517 0.0656 
0.0054 0.0126 
-0.1784 0.2667 
0.1934 0.2247 
-0.3407 0.6103 
-0.0244 0.0284 
-0,0644 0.1717 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.2872 0.1 173 
0.3069 0.0891 
0.0527 0. I 147 
0.3408 0.1867 
- 
35.18 
0.001 
0.77 
386.85 
8.01 
I .07 
1.02 
I .23 
0.01 
0.  I3 
0.08 
5.75 
I I .24 
3.41 
3.33 
0.001 
0.005 
0.303 
0.315 
0.269 
0.921 
0.719 
0.774 
0.018 
0.001 
0.067 
0.071 
0.007 I 
0.0207 
0.0055 
0. I766 
0.1824 
-0.1 I15 
0 
-0,1482 
0 
0.2674 
0 
0.2314 
0 
-0.2188 
- 0.2099 
-0.3779 
- 
0.0005 
0.0671 
0.0 I25 
0.265 I 
0.2235 
0.6059 
0.0984 
0.1713 
0.0961 
0.0882 
0.0974 
0.1035 
35.58 
0.001 
0.77 
390.26 
8.08 
I .08 
I .03 
1.24 
0.01 
0.13 
0.08 
5.81 
11.34 
3.44 
4.47 
0.001 
0.005 
0.301 
0.312 
0.267 
0.919 
0.718 
0.773 
0.017 
0.001 
0.066 
0.036 
‘When separate industry dummy variables are used the coefficients for Trucking and Telecommu- 
nications are negative and significant at the .I0 and .01 levels, respectively. The coefficient for utilities 
is also negative but not significant. It should be noted that when separate industry variables are used 
the firm size variable becomes significant at the .01 level and the RSquare increases to .80. 
Coding: 
LFee = natural log of audit fee. 
RAssets = square root of total assets. 
RSubs = square root of number of consolidated subsidiaries. 
FA = total foreign assetsltotal assets. 
R01 = net income (1oss)ltotal assets. 
DA = total long-term debtltotal assets. 
RlAA = square root of annual internal audit payroWtotal assets. 
CM = number of security registration forms filed. 
OP = Opinion-I for unqualified or consistency exception opinion or 0 for “subject to” qualification. 
I = Industry-I for regulated industry or 0 for nonregulated industry. 
MON = Month-of-year end = I for non-12/3 I year end or 0 for 12/3 I year end. 
Firm = B8 for Big Eight or Non-B8 for non-Big Eight. 
Firm-B8*I = firm by industry interaction effect. 
Firm-B8*CM = firm by capital market activity interaction effect. 
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Empirical evidence is provided partly in support of hypothesis 1 ( H , ) .  
The firm size by capital market activity interaction variable (Firm-B8*CM) 
is negative and significant (P-value = .036). An explanation for the negative 
coefficient is provided in the following. A graphical presentation of the 
interaction effect is shown in Figure 1. Levels 1 and 2 of the CM variable 
represent no security registration statements filed, and one or more security 
registration statements filed, respectively. Whereas for the firm size variable, 
levels 1 and 2 represent the Big Eight and non-Big Eight firms, respectively. 
The graph does bear out and highlight the significance of this interaction 
effect. 
The graph indicates that the fees charged by Big Eight auditors are much 
lower when the auditor is involved with client security registrations. The 
mean fee charged when Big Eight auditors are involved with security reg- 
istrations is $56,333, compared to a mean fee of $81,053 when they are 
not involved. However, for the non-Big Eight auditors, the fee is higher 
when they are involved in the security registration process. The mean fee 
charged when non-Big Eight auditors are involved in the registration process 
is $49,000, compared to a mean fee of $37,562 when they are not involved. 
The different impact of the Big Eight and non-Big Eight involvement in the 
security registration process may reflect the volume of registration work by 
the Big Eight and their specialization as evidenced by the fact that they 
provide advanced in-house training courses related to SEC registration 
forms. Thus, this differential impact of the firms’ involvement in the reg- 
istration process resulted in the negative coefficient. 
Figure I also provides data on intermediate and marginal cell means 
that were used to plot the firm by capital market activity interaction effect. 
The number indicated in parentheses is the frequency of observations in that 
cell. There were 1 1  I observations on auditees not filing any statements and 
28 observations on auditees filing one or more statements. The related mean 
audit fees for those filing no statements and those filing at least one are 
$52,450 and $52,929, respectively. The 53 observations on auditees with 
Big Eight auditors amount to a mean audit fee of $74,057, whereas the 
mean audit fee for 86 observations on auditees with non-Big Eight auditors 
is $39,291. 
Empirical evidence is provided in support of hypothesis 2 (H?) .  The 
firm size by industry interaction variable (Firm-B8*I) is positive and sig- 
nificant (P-value = .071). A graphical presentation of the interaction effect 
is provided in Figure 2. As indicated in the graph, the relationship is very 
pronounced. The graph shows that audit fees charged by both Big Eight 
and non-Big Eight firms appear to be lower in regulated industries as com- 
pared to non-regulated industries. This relationship is even steeper for the 
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FIGURE 1 
Graph of Firm by Capital Market Activity Interaction Effect 
Mean Audit Fee per level of 
lnteractlng Varlables 
Audit Fee (Thousands) 
JLuu I S81.053 
.\ $56,333 
SR-0 S W - 1  
Capital Market Activity 
- Non-Big 8 Big 8 
Intermediate and Marginal Cell Means 
Eixlcua 
Big 8 Non-Big 8 Totals 
SR-0 $81,053 $37,562 $52,450 
(38)  (73) (111) 
SR Forms Filed 
sR2-1 $56,333 $49,000 $52,929 
(13) (28 )  - - - - - - -  (15) 
(53) ( 8 6 )  
- - - - - - -  
Totals $74,057 $39,291 
SR-the number of security registration forms filed, which is the 
measure of client capital market activity used in this study. 
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FIGURE 2 
Graph of Firm by Industry Interaction Effect 
Mean Audit Fee per level of 
Interacting Variables 
Audit Fee (Thousands) 
$100 I 
$41.263 
$35.414 
$20 
Regulated Nonregulated 
Industry 
-c Non-Big 8 +Big 8 
Intermediate and Marginal Cell Means 
Firm TvDe 
Regulated 
Industry 
Nonregulated 
Totals 
Big 8 Non-Big 8 Totals 
$60,250 $35,414 $44,245 
(16) (29) (45) 
Big Eight firms. The mean fee charged by Big Eight auditors in regulated 
industries is $60,250, compared to $80,027 in nonregulated industries. Al- 
though the mean fee charged by non-Big Eight auditors in regulated indus- 
tries is $35,414, compared to $41,263 in nonregulated industries. 
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Figure 2 also provides data on intermediate and marginal cell means 
that were used to plot the firm by industry interaction effect. The number 
indicated in parentheses is the frequency of observations in that cell. The 
mean audit fees in regulated and nonregulated industries are $44,245 and 
$56,521, respectively. The table also provides the frequency and mean audit 
fee for combinations of levels of each variable. 
The results of tests performed in this section provide support for the 
hypothesis that the effect of audit firm size on audit fees is affected by or 
depends on the regulatory complexity of the client. This study provides 
evidence of significant interaction effects between audit firm size and client- 
industry regulatory complexity and client capital market activity. The graph- 
ical analysis of the interaction effects provides more information and new 
insights on the underlying relationships. Prior audit fee research failed to 
consider these interactions. Also, this study is consistent with the work by 
Danos and Eichenseher [ 1,2,3] concerning factors affecting changes in 
client-industry market shares. They provided evidence that client regulatory 
complexity confer scale opportunities to large CPA firms. The present study 
shows lower Big Eight audit fees in a regulated environment compared to 
a nonregulated one. Fees are even lower for non-Big Eight firms in regulated 
industries compared to nonregulated industries. Audit fees were not lower, 
however, for non-Big Eight firms involved with client security registration 
statements. 
3. Conclusion and Limitations 
This study examines the interacting relationship between audit firm size 
and variables proxying for client regulatory complexity to provide evidence 
on specific factors that might lead to large firms’ economies of scale. Those 
factors relate to client industry membership and the amount of client capital 
market activity. These factors were hypothesized to be negatively related 
to external audit fees based on arguments concerning increasing production 
economies of scale in providing auditing services. The primary hypotheses 
were tested by examining the effect of audit firm size on audit fees while 
varying the degree of client regulatory complexity. 
Evidence is provided in support of the primary hypotheses. More spe- 
cifically, in a small auditee subsample, the results indicate lower audit fees 
for both Big Eight and non-Big Eight firms in regulated industries compared 
to nonregulated industries. However, the difference is greater among the 
Big Eight firms. Also, the results indicate that fees charged by the Big Eight 
firms are lower when these firms are involved with client security registra- 
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tions. To the contrary, fees charged by the non-Big Eight firms are higher 
when they are involved with client security registrations. This result for the 
non-Big Eight firm involvement with security registrations is not consistent 
with the spillover of specialized knowledge acquired in the registration 
process to the recurring annual audit. However, the different impact of the 
Big Eight versus the non-Big Eight involvement in the security registration 
process may reflect the greater volume of registration work by the Big Eight 
and their specialization, as evidenced by the fact that they provide advanced 
in-house training courses related to SEC registration forms. 
Based on the results of this study, it appears that client regulatory 
complexity confers greater scale opportunities to larger audit firms compared 
to smaller ones. These scale opportunities are passed on to the auditee in 
the form of a lower audit fee. Thus, the analysis of interaction effects 
between firm size and regulatory aspects of the client provides more infor- 
mation and new insights on underlying relationships. 
It should be noted, however, that the present study does not attempt to 
examine factors, such as firm audit methodology, staff size, and multiple 
office locations, that may affect audit efficiency. Differences in these factors 
may even contribute to differential scale effects enjoyed among large ac- 
counting firms. This study basically represents an initial attempt to examine 
regulatory aspects of the client that might lead to large firms’ economies of 
scale. 
The results should be interpreted with caution because variables are 
weighted more heavily for some companies than others. Most companies 
did provide the three years of data requested. However, a few companies 
indicated the data were readily available only for the two most recent years. 
Also, i t  is important to note that the regulation captured in the industry 
regulatory complexity variable is conditioned only on its effect on formal 
accounting reports and the underlying audit process, because almost all 
industries in the U.S. economy are “regulated” to some extent in the sense 
that governmental bodies place constraints on their actions. Therefore, the 
assignment of companies to reguIated/nonregulated categories based on the 
SIC code may be an oversimplification given the different types and scopes 
of regulations in these industries. Further, the capital market activity variable 
could be proxying for some residual industry effect (e.g., utilities have more 
capital market activity as defined by this study). Caution must also be taken 
when attempting to generalize the results of this sample to those of larger 
samples. Likewise, generalizations are limited because the ability to observe 
price differences among audit firms may be sensitive to the definition of 
auditee size. 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
396 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE 
REFERENCES 
I .  P. Danos and J. Eichenseher. 1982. “Audit Industry Dynamics: Factors Affecting Changes in 
2. P. Danos and J. Eichenseher. 1986. “Long-Term Trends Toward Seller Concentration in the U.S. 
3. J. Eichenseher and P. Danos. 1981. “The Analysis of Industry Specific Auditor Concentration: 
4. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 1978. The Commission on Audifors’ 
es. Report, Conclusions. and Recommendations. The Commission on Auditors’ Re- 
Client-Industry Market Shares.” Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn): 604-616. 
Audit Market.” The Accounring Review (October): 633-50. 
Towards an Explanatory Model. ” The Accounting Review (July): 479-492. 
sponsibilities. New York: AICPA. 
5 .  H. Arnett and P. Danos. 1979. CPA Firm Viability. University of Michigan. ’ 
6. D. Simunic. 1980. “The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence.” Journal ofAccounring 
Research (Spring): 161- 190. 
7. J. Francis. 1984. “The Effect of Audit Finn Size on Audit Prices: A Study of the Australian 
Market.” Journal of Accounting and Economics (March): 133-151. 
8. J. Francis and D. Stokes. 1986. “Audit Prices, Product Differentiation and Scale Economies: 
Further Evidence from the Australian Market.” Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn): 383- 
393. 
9. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose. 1986. “Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence.” Journal of Ac- 
counring Research (Spring): 97-1 10. 
10. J. Francis and D. Simon. 1987. “A Test of Audit Pricing in the Small-Client Segment of the U.S. 
Audit Market.” The Accounring Review (January): 145-157. 
I I .  G .  Benston. 1979-80. “The Market for Public Accounting Services: Demand, Supply and Regu- 
lation.” The Accounting Journal (Winter): 2-46. 
12. Standard and Poor’s Regisrer of Corporations. Directors, and Executives. Vols. 1 and 3. 1985. 
New York: Standard and Poor’s Corporation. 
13. S. Harris. Who Audits America. 1985. Menlo Park, Calif.: Data Financial Press. 
14. L. De Angelo. 1981. “Auditor Independence, ‘Low Balling,’ and Disclosure Regulation.” Journal 
of Accounting and Economics (August): 113-127. 
15. A. M. Oppenheim. 1966. Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement. New York: Harper 
Books. 
16. S. Goldfeld and R. Quandt. 1965. “Some Tests for Homoscedasticity.” Journal of the American 
Srarisrical Association (June): 539-547. 
17. J. Neter. W. Wasserman, and M. Kutner. 1983. Applied Linear Regression Models. Homewood, 
I l l . :  Richard D. Irwin. 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
